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I. INTRODUCTION
Beautiful beaches and the tropical climate of Florida have lured
many new residents to this paradise over the past two decades.' Esti-
* The author expresses his gratitude to the firms of Akerman, Senterfitt &
Eidson and Michael M. McMahon and Gregory J. Kelly, Esqs. for the case briefs and
essential reports and for providing an understanding of underlying concepts.
1. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, estimated the projected
population growth to be highest from 1988 to 2000 in the following states:
State % Population Growth
Arizona 23.1
Nevada 21.1
New Mexico 20.6
Florida 20.3
Georgia 19.4
Alaska 19.3
Although Florida is not the highest in percentage of population growth among the
states, the raw numbers of population increases in Florida effect county operations.
This comment is centered around St. Johns County, Florida. The Bureau of the
Census has estimated the population change in St. Johns County to be:
1961) (Census) 1970 (Census) 1980 (Census) 1989 (Est.)
30,034 31,035 51,303 84,389
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mates for the year 2000 indicate no relief for Florida, with a projected
increase of 2,639,000 people.' State taxes, bonds and funds3 have sup-
ported infrastructure improvements necessitated by such population
growth in the past. However, regulations and impact fees' are tools of
the present, 5 used to shift the cost of these improvements to those who
%3.3* %65.3* %64.5*
* Percent change in population between the represented years.
2. Calculated from the percentage estimates of the United States Bureau of the
Census.
3.
(I) The district school fund shall consist of funds derived from the district
school tax levy; state appropriations; appropriations by county commission-
ers; local, state, and federal school food service funds; any and all other
sources for school purposes; national forest trust funds and other federal
sources; and gifts and other sources.
St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 641 (Fla. 1991)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 236.24(1) (1989)).
4. Impact fees are defined as:
[The] charges or fees levied by a governmental unit against new de-
velopment for the purpose of acquiring or recovering some or all of the
cost of providing the public infrastructure facilities needed to support the
new growth or development paying the fees. They are variously referred to
as impact fees, capital recovery fees, capital contributions, development
share charges, municipal utilities system charges, access fees, and a host of
other aliases. The name is never important. The fees are defined, as a prac-
tical matter, by their purpose and effect.
. . . [The] fee system is devised . . . [to require] each unit of growth
or development to pay its pro-rata share of the cost of providing the public
works facilities necessary to support the new development. Any fee struc-
ture designed to accomplish this specific purpose is an impact fee.
E. Allen Taylor, Jr., How to Develop and Use Impact Fees Successfully, 1988 INST. ON
PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.02 (emphasis added); see also Julian C.
Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments'
Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 417 (1981) (Impact fees are
defined as "charges levied by local governments against new development in order to
generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development.") (emphasis
added).
5. See, e.g., Eager v. Florida Builders Ass'n. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth.,
580 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (system development fees were charged
for both "new and existing customers who modify, add or construct facilities which
impose a potential demand on the water system"); City of Hallandale v. ACMAR
Eng'g Corp., 560 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding "that a building
permit does not provide a developer with a vested right to avoid [a] later enacted [im-
pact or reserve capacity] fee"); Babcock Co. v. State, Land & Water Adjudicatory
[Vol. 16
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created their demand-developers 6  trying to accommodate new
residents.
The issues in St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders
Ass'n,' are centered around the constitutional validity of the St. Johns
County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance. 8 In 1986, the St. Johns
County School Board requested that educational facilities be included
in the county's impact fee program.9 Thereafter, the Educational Im-
pact Fee Ordinance was designed to generate revenue from developers,
and in turn from residents, who "may reasonably be expected to place
students in the public schools of St. Johns County ... ."10 The ordi-
nance stated that the funds collected were to be used to "construct,
expand and equip the educational sites and educational capital facilities
necessitated by new development."' 1 This revenue generated from the
impact fee would be placed in a special trust fund to defray the costs of
Comm'n, 558 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (transportation impact fees);
City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding constitutional rights of the developer were not violated by the assessment of
"developmental impact fees" for sewer, solid waste and traffic control); City of Ormond
Beach v. County of Volusia, 535 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
municipal ordinance exempting properties in municipality from county road impact fee
was invalid). See generally Jerome G. Rose, Development Fees-To What Extent May
Municipalities Shift the Costs of Public Improvements to New Developments, 16
REAL EST. L.J. 356 (1988).
6. "It is a person's status (as the developer of dwelling units that require addi-
tional public facilities capacity) that triggers the requirement to pay impact fees
. .. " Petitioners' Initial Brief at 14, St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders
Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (No. 75,986) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
7. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla.
1991).
8. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 (Oct. 20, 1987).
9. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
10. This ordinance provided that either the developer or residents can be
feepayers because the ordinance defines a feepayer as "a person commencing a land
development activity which may reasonably be expected to place students in the public
schools of St. Johns County and which requires the issuance of a building permit for a
residential building or structure or permit for residential mobile home installation." St.
Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 5(A) (Oct. 20, 1987) (emphasis added). In
addition, section 8(A) states: "The person applying for the issuance of a building per-
mit for accessory structures, additions to and remodeling of existing structures, ...
shall pay the fee .... " St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 8(A) (Oct. 20,
1987) (emphasis added)(the ordinance does not differentiate between whether the de-
velopers or resident homeowners pay the fee).
11. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637 (citing St. Johns County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 87-61) § 10(B) (Oct. 20, 1987)).
1991]
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increasing educational facility capacity needed to support the addi-
tional students.12 All funds collected that were not expended within a
six year period would be refunded to the property's current
landowner. 3
In June of 1988, the Northeast Florida Builders Association
brought suit to declare the St. Johns County Educational Impact Fee
ordinance unconstitutional." In April of 1990, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. 15 Judge Harris, speaking for the majority of the Fifth
District, stated that the ordinance "violate[d] the free public school
provision, because as enacted, the impact fee [was] nothing more than
a user fee."'" The court then certified the issue of new development
funding of new school construction to the Florida Supreme Court.'"
Subsequently, in August of 1991, the Florida Supreme Court, in re-
versing the Fifth District, decided that the St. Johns County Educa-
tional Impact Fee Ordinance for new school facility construction did
not violate the "constitutional mandate for free public schools."' 8
The certified question, insufficiently answered by the Florida Su-
preme Court and addressed by this comment, was whether impact fees,
levied for the construction of new school facilities, were a form of con-
stitutional regulatory device or just another twist on taxation?' 9 This
comment advocates that the Florida Supreme Court did not sufficiently
analyze the problems posed by this question. Rather, the court semanti-
12. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 9 (Oct. 20, 1987).
13. Id., § I I(B).
14. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at I (motions for summary judgment were
filed and the appeal decided in favor of the Northeast Florida Builders Association).
15. St. Johns County v. Notheast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 363, 363-64
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (1991).
16. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. The question certified to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance was: "[W]hether St. Johns County could impose an impact fee on new
residential construction to be used for new school facilities." St. Johns County, 583 So.
2d at 636 (emphasis added). The supreme court determined that the "ordinance did
not create an unlawful delegation of power," and upheld the validity of the ordinance
subject to the removal of section 7(b) and a county-wide agreement to the ordinance.
Id. at 639-42.
19. This question is asked by many authors reviewing the constitutionality of
impact fees in general. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 422-27;
John M. Payne, Housing Impact Fees, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 75 (1991); Rose, supra note
5, at 358-59; Taylor, supra note 4, at § 11.04(1).
[Vol. 16
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cally manipulated the language of a newly accepted method of raising
revenue to cope with other services2 in order to accommodate new
school facility construction.
This comment is divided into four parts. First, part I is a discus-
sion of relevant case history on impact fees and their effect on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision in St. Johns County.2" Part II then ad-
dresses some of the constitutional challenges presented by this case.
The principal argument is that the St. Johns County Educational Im-
pact Fee is an unconstitutional tax masqueraded as a land use regula-
tion, and therefore, that it violates the constitutional mandate for a
"uniform system of free public schools."'2 2 In particular, part II argues
that the removal of section 7(B) 23 from the St. Johns County Ordi-
nance24 will not, in and of itself"6 , cure the constitutional defects2 6 ad-
20. Examples of service increases are the expansion for sewer and waste disposal,
roads, emergency medical services, police and fire protection. See generally Juergen-
smeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 417.
21. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d 635.
22. "Section 1. System of public education. - Adequate provision shall be made
by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, mainte-
nance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education pro-
grams that the needs of the people may require." FLA. CON T. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis
added).
23. Section seven titled, "Computation of the Amount of Educational Facilities
Impact Fee" states in part:
B. If a feepayer opts not to have the impact fee determined according
to paragraph (A) of this section, then the feepayer shall prepare and sub-
mit to the St. Johns County School Board an independent fee calculation
study for the land development activity for which a building permit or
permit for mobile home installation is sought. The student generation and/
or educational impact documentation submitted shall show the basis upon
which the independent fee calculation was made. The St. Johns County
School Board may adjust the educational facilities impact fee to that
deemed to be appropriate given the documentation submitted by the
feepayer. The County Administrator shall make the appropriate modifica-
tion upon notice of such adjustment from the School Board.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 7(B) (October 20, 1987).
24. Id.
25. In addition to section 7(B), sections 7(A)(5), (A)(6) and 5(D) offer a similar
constitutional defect; they resemble a user fee:
(A)(5) If the type of development activity that a building permit is
applied for is not specified on the above fee schedules, the County Admin-
istrator shall use the fee applicable to the most nearly comparable type of
land use on the above fee schedules. The County Administrator shall be
guided in the selection of a comparable type by information provided by
1991]
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dressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 27 Part III deals with the
need for adopting a "less intrusive alternative means"28 component to
the "dual rational nexus test ' 29 used by the Florida Supreme Court to
evaluate this impact fee. Part IV reviews and analyzes the St. Johns
County Ordinance3" with special attention to the test adopted and ap-
the School Board of St. Johns County. If the County Administrator deter-
mines that there is no comparable type of land use on the above fee sched-
ule then the County Administrator shall request a determination by the
School Board of the appropriate fee.
(A)(6) In the case of change of use, redevelopment, or expansion or
modification of an existing use which requires the issuance of a building
permit or permit for mobile home installation, the impact fee shall be
based upon the net positive increase in the impact fee for the new use as
compared to the previous use. The Count Administrator shall be guided in
this determination by student generation statistics provided by the St.
Johns County School Board.
(5)(D) "Land Development Activity Which May Reasonably Be Ex-
pected To Place Students in the Public Schools of St. Johns County"
means any change in land use or any construction or installation of resi-
dential buildings or structures or any change in the use of any structure
that will result in additional students in the public schools of St. Johns
County.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60, §§ 7(A)(5), 7(A)(6), 5(D) (October 20,
1987) (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 10.
27. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 364.
28. See John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 139 (Winter 1987).
29. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
30. The ordinance reads as follows:
An ordinance relating to the regulation of the use and development of land
in St. Johns County, Florida; imposing an impact fee on land development
in St. Johns County for providing new schools and related facilities neces-
sitated by such new development; stating the authority for adoption of the
ordinance; providing definitions; providing findings and declarations of the
board of county commissioners; providing for the payment and time of
payment of an educational facilities impact fee; providing a method of
payment of the fee; providing for the remittal of fees collected and their
expenditure by the school board of St. Johns County for educational capi-
tal purposes; providing for refund of unexpended funds; providing for ex-
emptions and credits; providing for severability; providing for penalties;
providing an effective date.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 (October 20, 1987) (preamble) (titled as the
Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance).
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plied by the court, the effect of footnote six8l on the constitutional va-
lidity of the ordinance and the effect this ordinance will have on other
counties throughout the state.3 2
II. FLORIDA IMPACT FEES
Based on recent Bureau of Census reports, Florida municipalities
have felt the effect of population increases in many areas of land devel-
opment. Florida courts have already addressed the needs of growing
communities for the funding of additional infrastructures such as water
and sewer systems 33 roads,3' parks 5 and other recreational facilities,
through impact fees. However, the imposition of an impact fee via a
county ordinance, for the explicit use of constructing new school facili-
31. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640 n.6. The court in this footnote suggests
that age limitations or restrictions entered into by a mutual covenant, as exhibited by
the condominium owners in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d
346, 350 (Fla. 1979) (where age limitations were for minors under the age of twelve),
would not undermine the position taken by the court. Cf. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d
at 640.
The Florida Supreme Court's position in their objection to section 7(B) of the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance was that it "permits households that
do not contain public school children to avoid paying the fee . . . [and would] have the
potential of being user fees . . . thereby colliding with the constitutional requirement
of free public schools." Id. It is difficult, if not impossible, to harmonize this position
with the position of the court in footnote six. The only distinction between the court's
previous position in objecting to the section 7(B) adult retirement facilities exemption,
and the one mentioned in footnote six, is the unchangeable future position of the resi-
dence agreement to the land use restriction; i.e., a school child can not later occupy this
residence: which is subject to the land use restriction. However, these distinctions only
strengthen the position that the impact fees are simply user fees directed "primarily
[at] those households that do contain public school children ...... Id. (emphasis
added).
32. Based on figures from the United States Bureau of the Census, counties such
as Osceola with a 98% increase estimated for the period from 1980 to 1989, and other
counties with large population percentage changes, will be effected by this decision.
33. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); see also City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon
Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
34. See Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446
So. 2d 14.0 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1984);
see also Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
35. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), petition denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983).
1991]
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ties, is an issue of first impression 6 in Florida.
Impact fees have gained acceptance in Florida because of their
ability to shift the cost of public service improvements and new con-
struction from the municipality to the developer.37 The intended pur-
pose of many impact fees is to achieve a perfect society, where all its
citizenry are paying their "fair share"3 8 of public services used as cal-
culated by some type of "magic meter."3 9 Obviously, use of such a
36. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
Although municipality designed impact fees are new to the South, the first impact
fee was a 1957 New Jersey fee imposed for new school facility construction. Taylor,
supra note 4, at § 11.03. Albeit the court in Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129
A.2d 265 (N.J. 1957), decided the invalidity of the impact fee on grounds that assis-
tance for increased municipality population "must come not from the municipality nor
from the courts but from legislature[;]" its ironic that this comment is also based on an
impact fee for new school facility construction and the competing philosophies behind
who should bear the burden of increased facility costs. Id. at 268.
37. Although the county's intent has been characterized as shifting the economic
burden from the municipality to the developer, in actuality, the cost is passed through
to the intended user. This actual intent of the ordinance is evident by the underlying
meaning of sections 5(D) (where only those additions are charged which would change
the land use by generating additional students in public school), 7(A)(6) (where im-
pact fees for modification of existing structures "shall be based upon the net positive
increase in the impact fee for the new use as compared to the previous use") and
I I(B) (which shows an understanding that the impact fee was passed on to the
purchase price of the home and should be refunded to the then "current landowner").
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60, §§ 5(D), 7(A)(6), I1(B) (Oct. 20 1987)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 321 (The court stated "[t]he cost
of new facilities should be borne by new users. ... ) (emphasis added).
38. "Fair Share" can best be explained by the name given to the Palm Beach
County Ordinance for road improvements: Fair Share Contribution for Road Improve-
ments Ordinance. See Palm Beach County Ordinance 79-7 (1980); cf. St. Johns
County, 583 So. 2d at 640 (where the intended purpose of the St. Johns County Ordi-
nance is "to regulate the use and development of land so as to assure that new develop-
ment bears a proportionate share of the cost of capital expenditures necessary to pro-
vide public educational sites and facilities in St. Johns County.").
39. The term "magic meter," put forth by counsel for the Builders, is an impor-
tant concept in understanding the underlying theory of impact fees. In the area of
public services, the ideal situation would be the ability of having a "magic meter"
calculating the amount of services used by each member of the community. For exam-
ple, if every time you ran your car on a public road the "magic meter" began to tic off
usage time, the county could accurately assess a person's road usage and send them a
bill. If every time a person flushed their toilet the meter ran on their usage of the
sewage system, they could then be assessed a pro rata share of the cost. Interview with
Michael McMahon, Counsel for the Builders in St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla.
Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (July 29, 1991).
[Vol. 16
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meter is impossible. However, this is exactly what impact fees are
designed to model-the perfect fee assessment.
The purpose of the St. Johns County ordinance parallels a model
impact fee by attempting to distribute the cost of increasing the capac-
ity of school facilities to those who have created their need.' 0 Although
this is a politically laudable gesture by the county, the developers con-
tend that it is at odds with the Florida constitutional mandate for pub-
lic free schools 4' and is therefore inconsistent with the county's power
to raise revenue. 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Home Builders & Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners,' has credited Flor-
ida home rule powers" as offering adequate authority for county gov-
erning bodies to implement impact fees. In fact, many counties
throughout Florida have now designed ordinances or regulations to levy
impact fees on developers.' 5 This article focuses primarily on the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance 87-60 as an example
of these impact fees.
The main assertion in opposition to the constitutionality of the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance was that it bears a
keen resemblance to a user fee.4" The principal case relied on by the
40. Previous impact fees have been predicated on direct ties between the need
and demand created by new growth. See Rose, supra note 5, at 356.
41. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Scavella v. School Bd., 363 So. 2d
1095 (Fla. 1978).
42. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 641.
43. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So.
2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
44. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (Supp. 1990).
Home rule power is the power vested in cities and towns as "an inherent right of
local self-government" which is supported by the local government's ability to best pro-
tect their own needs. 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 1.40, .42 (3d ed. 1987). Although
the is no clear distinction between state and local activity, the effect of rapidly increas-
ing local populations necessitates the need for increased local control, because any "ap-
propriate regulation . . . varies in accordance with the density, geographical location,
physical conditions, the needs and conveniences to be furnished and the means to se-
cure them, and the standards of the inhabitants as well." Id., § 1.64. Accordingly, local
government's right of home rule power may be the best manner for serving the people
of that particular region.
45. E.g., Palm Beach County Ordinance 79-7 (1980) (Fair Share Contribution
for Road Improvements Ordinance); see Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So.
2d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (development of county level parks).
46. A user fee is defined as "[ciharges imposed on persons for the use of a par-
ticular facility." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990).
1991]
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Florida Supreme Court was Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of
Dunedin,4 7 which stands for the proposition that funds collected by im-
pact fees must be "limited to meeting the costs of expansion."'4 8 Al-
though correctly cited for this proposition, the case stands for a much
larger principle; there is "nothing wrong with transferring to the new
user of a municipality [service] a fair share of the [additional] costs
[increased capacity] of the system involves."'49 This principle is the
common thread that weaves through all of the cases involving impact
fees, complicating the distinction between "impact fee" and "user fee."
As a user fee, even the county would have to agree with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal that the fee violated the free public school
mandate.5 0 However, the county identifies the Educational Facilities
Ordinance as a "development exaction" 51 and not a "user fee," with
the distinction that the fee is for increasing facility capacity, not actual
use.52 The reality is that developers of new residential areas are being
charged an additional fee,53 apart from the future payment of ad
valorem taxes. 4 The distinction should not lie in whether one is being
charged for the use of a facility or the expansion of the facility's capac-
ity.55 Rather, it should be determined by a test applicable to the spe-
cific parameters of the needed services created by the new development.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Broward County v. Janis
Development Corp.58 set the stage for the development of impact fee
47. 329 So. 2d 314.
48. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637 (citing Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 320).
49. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 317-18.
50. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 363.
51. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 17.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Assuming that the impact fee is initially charged to the developer will, by the
very nature that "subdividing is a profit-making enterprise," be passed onto the
homebuyers. See Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
54. Ad valorem taxes can be defined as "[a] tax levied on property or an article
of commerce in proportion to its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
55. The impact fees for roads, schools, public buildings, police, fire, emergency
medical services, and parks estimated in the Methodology Study, are the totals for each
specific structural unit. These fees represent a proportional share of the cost to provide
additional facilities. See St. Johns County Impact Fee Methodology, prepared by Dr. J.
Nicholas (Dr. J. Nicholas was the county consultant developing these impact fees.)
[hereinafter Methodology Study].
56. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
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parameters. In Janis Development, the court rejected an impact fee for
road construction because the "fee was simply an exaction of money to
be put in trust for roads, which must be paid before developers may
build" without stipulating the use for which the funds are collected.57
This same court later, in Palm Beach County, 8 affirmed the validity of
an impact fee ordinance for road improvements, recognizing that the
ordinance followed the lessons expressed by the court in Dunedin69 re-
garding the defects in the Janis Development60 ordinance. The Fourth
District Court stated that a proper impact fee is a fee that assures the
cost of the improvements will exceed the funds collected, and that those
funds will be used to benefit the new development."1 However, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court is now faced not with road improvements or water
and sewer connections, but new school facilities.
In the area of education, the generation of funds for new school
facilities; should come from the populace as a whole, because in actual-
ity it is the populace as a whole which will benefit. However, the St.
Johns ordinance divides the paying population into two constituents:
first, the residents of the new development; and second, only the resi-
dences that would "reasonably" require the service.62 Under previous
fee adjudications, the theory of having the new user pay a "fair share
57. Id. at 375.
58. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d at 145.
59. 329 So. 2d at 320-21.
60. Id. at 318.
61. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d at 145.
62. See, e.g., St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 5(D) (Oct. 20 1987)
(where the ordinance defines some land development activity under the criteria of
whether "that [development] will result in additional students in the public schools.").
In addition, in the City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So.
2d 324, the Second District Court of Appeal is now considering under a Water and
Sewer Impact Fee, the problems that arise because "the ordinance fails to direct the
building official as to the method and manner in which credits are to be allowed or
applied in determining whether there is or is not a fee due for the new or expanded use
of a remodeled structure .... " Id. at 326-27. It is quite possible that if section 5(D)
of the St. Johns County ordinance was permitted to remain, problems would arise in
determining what constitutes the meaning of what "will result in additional students in
the public schools," as well as being violative as a direct user fee.
It is this author's opinion that section 5(D) is as detrimental to the validity of the
ordinance as the court feels 7(B) is, where "impact fees have the potential of being
user fees that will be paid primarily by those households that do contain public school
children, thereby colliding with the constitutional requirement of free public schools."
St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.
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of the costs which new use of the system involves," 63 was appropriate.
However, this is not the case where school facilities are concerned. Im-
pact fees for educational facilities are different from all others because
of Florida's constitutional mandate for a "uniform system of free pub-
lic schools," 6' and the scope of the proposed infrastructure project.6 5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF ORDINANCE 87-60
The main constitutional challenge presented by the St. Johns
County Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance66 is whether it vi-
olates the mandate for a "uniform system of free public schools."6
The application of this ordinance, irrespective of the language in which
it is couched," is violative of the constitutional mandate for a uniform
system of free public schools. There is virtually no difference, except
semantically, between access to public schools being dependent upon
the payment of tuition, or the payment of a fee prior to all construction
that would place a student in the public school.6 9 The basis for this
63. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 318.
64. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; cf. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 440
(stating "[although a distinction could be made between sewer and water facilities
and education . . . all are necessary services normally provided by local govern-
ments.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
65. It is a fundamental premise that, as municipalities grow, there is a
continual need for the new public improvements as well as for mainte-
nance and expansion of existing infrastructure and public facilities. Local
jurisdictions have traditionally been responsible for the provision of major
infrastructure improvements such as roads, schools, parks, sewage, and
drainage facilities. Financing of these improvements has come from gen-
eral revenues, most notably the real property tax, and through issuance of
general obligation bonds which are repaid from local property tax
revenues.
Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 140.
66. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 2(A) (Oct. 20, 1987) (the ordi-
nance shall be known and may be cited as the "St. Johns County Educational Facilities
Impact Fee Ordinance").
67. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § I (emphasis added).
68. Justice Harris of the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that even though
the ordinance is "couched in the broad language of an impact fee, it is ultimately
assessed only against those households that have children in public school." St. Johns
County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 559 So. 2d 363, 364 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (where in footnote two, Justice
Harris offered his objection to section 7(B), listing examples such as retirement homes,
nursing homes and families with children in private schools).
69. Cf St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639.
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constitutional challenge is created by the interpretation given to the
meaning of "free public schools."
The concerted understanding is that "free" was intended to mean
that a child will not be prevented from attending a public school be-
cause his or her tuition had not been paid.70 The line between paying
for a present use and paying for a future use is thin, and should not be
the justification for determining that the impact fee is not a user fee. A
question posed by this interpretation is: How far from the schoolhouse
door is the county permitted to charge a fee? 71 One conceivable answer
to this question is determined by how far removed payment of the fee is
from being attributed to the homeowner. From this answer it is ardu-
ous to offer opposition to Justice Harris' logical conclusion in the Fifth
District Court's decision that: "Whether the money is paid directly to
the school board as tuition or to the county commission and delivered
to the school board when the family of public school children build or
buy [or remodel] a home in the district seems to have little practical
distinction. ' 72 Although the Florida Supreme Court stated that "St.
Johns County [had] initiated a comprehensive study of whether to im-
pose impact fees to finance additional infrastructure, 73 the methodol-
ogy study examined by the court only appraised one method of meeting
the needed increase in facility capacity, impact fees, and did not ad-
dress other "alternative financing mechanisms. '
A facilities task force was appointed by the Commissioner of Edu-
cation in 1989 to examine the projected education capital outlay needs
for Florida up to the year 2000."6 Specifically outlined was the possibil-
70. Although counsel for the county states this is not the effect of the ordinance,
because "[t]he parent [will be] in the 'pokey' but the child will be in school at no
charge," counsel for the Homebuilders' believes "imprisonment of a parent is a price
no child should have to pay." Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 21; Answer Brief of
Respondents at 24, St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (No. 75,986) [here-
inafter Respondents' Brief].
71. This is one of the many questions raised while discussing the case with Mr.
McMahon. Interview with Michael P. McMahon, Counsel for the Builders in St. Johns
County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (July 29, 1991).
72. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 365.
73. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla.
1991).
74. Facilities Task Force, A Report to the Commissioner, at 7 (February 1990)
(available at the office of Commissioner of Education) [hereinafter Facilities Task
Force].
75. Id.
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ity of providing "alternative funding mechanisms" 6 to meet capital
outlay needs. One of these alternative mechanisms, and the first goal
addressed by the Task Force, was the "maximizing of all existing re-
sources" 77 as a means of reducing capital outlay needs rather than sim-
ply determining a method for funding new school construction. In St.
Johns County, there was no indication that the Florida Supreme Court
reviewed this study or any study emphasizing a reduction in capital
outlay needs. In contrast, there is a methodology study which addresses
a singular means for responding to population growth through mathe-
matical calculations of student population and the required facility
square footage to meet these student needs .7 The court should not be
attempting to determine that impact fees are acceptable methods of
"provid[ing] the capacity to serve the educational needs of . . . [the]
dwelling units,' 79 without first determining whether the municipality
attempted to maximize the potential of their present facilities.8 "
Whether or not St. Johns County has effectively attempted to
maximize facility use should become a factor in determining the valid-
ity of the ordinance. Paralleling the logic used by the Florida Supreme
Court in rejecting the Homebuilder's contention that this impact fee is
nothing more than a tax, is the argument rejecting the imposition of
impact fees to resolve the need for "units of new residential develop-
ment"'" as "too simplistic."8 2 The court should balance the ability of
alternative methods for funding capital outlay projects and not simply
alternative methods of funding these projects.83
Equally important to the logic of the Florida Supreme Court's de-
cision in approving this ordinance 4 is that the fee is charged to the
76. Id. (letter from Chairman, D. Burke Kibler, III of the Task Force to the
Commissioner of Education).
77. Id. at 12.
78. Methodology Study, supra note 55, at 20-24.
79. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638-39 (emphasis added).
80. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74, at 12-14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. The Facilities Task Force met in 1989 to research the occurring school fund-
ing crisis. The Task Force was organized to recommend funding alternatives for public
education capital outlay needs. See Facilities Task Force, supra note 74. One of the
alternatives recommended to the Commissioner of Education was to consider maximiz-
ing the potential use of the present facilities, an alternative that should have been ad-
dressed by the court. Id.
84. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 642 (with the exception of section 7(B), and
then not unless all municipalities have entered into interlocal agreements, no fee can be
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developer and not the homeowner or facility user.85 The county con-
tends that the homeowner is not economically affected because the
housing market sets the price of the homes.86 Alternatively, if the im-
pact fee is passed on to the homeowner the ordinance could be deemed
a user fee, and therefore violative of the constitutional mandate for
"free public schools."8 As a result, the court recognized the proposed
concerns that the ordinance resembles a user fee, 88 and considered the
severance: of section 7(B) to cure the constitutional defect.
Section 7(B) threatened the validity of the ordinance, because it
enabled the impact fee to be directed at the homes of potential users of
the school facility, and not charged indirectly to the units within the
development as a whole.89 Severance of section 7(B) would also effect
the intended purpose of this ordinance: shifting the cost of newly cre-
ated needs to those who created the needs; namely, the developers. Al-
though the county's position is that "a fair reading of Section seven
(B) ... does not provide for the kind of case by case exemption
pointed to by the Fifth District Court," 90 the Florida Supreme Court
viewed this section as exempting those who could show that they will
not impact school facilities, and therefore, required severance of the
section .91
charged).
85. Cf. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § II(B) (Oct. 20, 1987) (the
ordinance states that if the funds collected are not expended for school facility con-
struction, they will be returned to the present landowner). This statement strengthens
the argument that the impact fee has been passed to the landowner.
86. The petitioners' initial brief in this case states that "logic, common sense and
practical economics suggest that if impact fees are passed through to anyone by a de-
veloper, the likely "pass-throughee" will be the raw land owner ..... Petitioners'
Brief, supra note 6, at 15 n.13.
87. Respondents' Brief, supra note 70, at 12 n.10 (stating from the record that
"empirical studies conclude that impact fees are ultimately paid by the home
buyers.").
88. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640. "[S]even (B) permits households that
do not contain public school children to avoid paying the fee. This means that the
impact fees have the potential of being user fees that will be paid primarily by those
households that do contain public school children, thereby colliding with the constitu-
tional requirement for free public schools." Id. (emphasis added).
89. State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 352 (1939). "The Constitu-
tion establishes a fundamental policy of making the populace as a whole bear the ex-
pense of an educational system which directly and primarily benefits the populace as a
whole." Respondents' Brief, supra note 70, at 14 (emphasis added).
90. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 19.
91. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla.
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Severance of section 7(B) from the ordinance resulted in the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's perception that "[w]e believe the ordinance, ab-
sent section seven (B), constitutes a workable scheme within the legis-
lative intent." 92 However, in footnote six, which states "[w]hile not
necessary to the validity of the ordinance, we should not find objection-
able a provision that exempted from the payment of an impact fee per-
mits to build adult facilities in which, because of land use restrictions,
minors could not reside," 93 the court demonstrated that it was not sure
of the definition of this "workable scheme." The court's logic used to
find section 7(B) unconstitutional should have also worked to conclude
that the court's position on adult facilities was objectionable, and there-
fore unconstitutional. An appropriate finding would be that, because
the entire county would benefit from an educated community, the
county as a whole should generate the required revenue.
It is understandable that the court feels a homeowner who will
never impact the educational system should not be required to pay the
educational facility impact fee.94 However, this is contrary to the
court's previous position which rejected the Homebuilders' argument
"that because many of the new residents will have no impact on the
public school system, the impact fee is nothing more than a tax insofar
as those residentces are concerned."'95 Covenants and land use restric-
tions placed on the residency of school aged children should not affect
the fees under the court's theory of the case, because the fee is di-
rected at the developer, not the homeowner. Consequently, footnote six
addresses a single group who would be offended by this ordinance,97
and as a result, is destructive to the court's logic that impact fees are
1991).
92. Id. at 640.
93. Id. at 640 n.6.
94. An inference drawn from footnote six is that because of land use restrictions,
there can be no minor residents and therefore there will be no impact on the public
educational system. Id.
95. Id. at 638; see, e.g., Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (where the court dealt
with an amount and use of funds which "smacked more of revenue raising which is
descriptive of a tax."); See generally Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 423-24
(revenue raised for the expansion of municipal facilities or services is usually classified
as a tax).
96. See McLain Western #1 v. County of San Diego, 194 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct.
App. 1983) (where the court said it is fair to assess developers of retirement
communities).
97. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640 n.6 (retirement home purchasers).
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not user fees.
The Florida Supreme Court's logic becomes conflicting where, in
one discussion the developer is acknowledged as the only entity being
effected by the impact fee,'3 and then in another argument the home-
owner is acknowledged as being effected." A major premise underlying
the claim that only the developer is effected, is the theory that the price
of a home is determined by the market, with no affect by impact fees.
This theory conflicts with the language of the ordinance which provides
for the "impact fee" to be refunded to the current landowner immedi-
ately after six years'00 if the funds have not been used for new facility
construction. 10' Consequently, the ordinance indicates that the land-
owner, and possibly the homeowner, is the fee-payer. 102 The potential
abrogation of constitutional rights in St. Johns County requires the
court to redefine the ordinance's general meaning of "fee-payer."''
Section five of the St. Johns County ordinance illustrates a rela-
98. The impact fee is paid by the developer at the permit stage, which is
designed to "provide the capacity to serve the educational needs of all ... units." Id.
at 638-39.
99. Acknowledging that a homeowner is affected by the imposition of the impact
fee is expressed with disapproval in the court's discussion over the validity of section
7(B), id. at 640, and again in footnote six with the non-objection to an exemption
provision for adult communities, id. at 640 n.6.
100. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § II(B) (Oct. 20, 1987).
101. "Any refunds not expended . . . following six (6) years from the date the
educational facilities impact fee was paid shall, upon application from the then current
landowner, be returned to such landowner with interest at the rate of six percent (6 %)
per annum . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Returning these unused funds to the current
landowner implies an understanding that the educational impact fees were indirectly
paid by the current landowner. This theory runs contrary to the logic expressed by the
county and that of Justice Sharp (dissenting), that a "way must be found to constitu-
tionally require those who wish to expand Florida's residential facilities [developer] to
shoulder a fair share of the resulting increase in costs of schools." Petitioners' Brief,
supra note 6, at 43 (citing St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 366 (Sharp, J., dissenting))
(emphasis and modification in original).
In addition, section 12(A)(1), Exemptions and Credits of the Ordinance, states
that exemptions for expansion of existing buildings only occurs "where no additional
public school enrollment will be produced over and above that produced by the existing
use." St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 §§ 12(2)-(4) (Oct. 20 1987) (emphasis
added). Section 12(A)(1) seems to address the logic that the ordinance is intended to
be addressed not at developers, but at those units which will be intended users or mak-
ers of the need for new service increases.
102. However, the developer is not excluded from being the fee-payer at the end
of six years if the land is not sold.
103. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance § 5(A) (Oct. 20, 1987).
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tionship between a development activity and the fee-payer, in particu-
lar, section 5(A) makes reference to "a land development activity
which may reasonably be expected to place students in the public
schools. 10 4 This is further defined in section 5(D) as "any change in
the use of any structure that will result in additional students in the
public schools of St. Johns County." 106 The implication is that a home-
owner remodeling his existing home will be charged this fee if addi-
tional public school students will result. This example shows that it is
possible that: 1) the fee-payer is the homeowner, and 2) the impact fee
is related to the attendance of additional students" 6 and therefore, the
fee would be paid only "by those households [where remodelling would
produce additional] . . . public school children. ' 10 7 According to the
court's position, these elements would have "the effect of converting the
educational facilities impact fee into a user fee . . . ."108 As such, this
educational impact fee is violative of the constitutional mandate for
free public schools and beyond the county's power to enact land use
regulations, as provided by the Florida Legislature.109
The Florida Legislature has authorized the implementation of
"comprehensive planning programs to guide and control future devel-
opment."110 Pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Plan-
ning and Land Development Act ("Growth Management Act"),"' the
Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the legislative intent is to
"facilitat[e] the adequate and efficient provision of schools," in particu-
lar the county's involvement in financing." 2 Granted, the Growth Man-
agement Act defines its intent as "encourag[ing] the most appropriate
use of . . . resources, consistent with the public interest ... ."I" This
definition is an example of the legislature's awareness of the need for
104. Id.
105. Id., § 5(D).
106. Cf. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639.
107. Id. at 640 (emphasis added) (the term "additional" was added to the quote
by this author to represent the particular example; however, it does not detract from
the court's view that if a fee is directed at the user it will be violative of the constitu-
tional mandate for free public schools).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1989).
110. Id., § 163.3161(2).
111. Id., § 163.3161.
112. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 642 (citing FLA. STAT. § 236.012(4)
(1989)).
113. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(3).
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maximizing the capacity of the present school facilities. Therefore, the
Florida Supreme Court should examine other methods of "increasing
school facility capacity" which would also address Justice Sharp's view
that "this state [would face] potential fiscal and social catastrophe
* . ." if impact fees for schools were found unconstitutional.114 The
problem facing the court in determining the best alternative to the im-
position of impact fees is that the dual rational nexus test does not
require this examination by the court.
The Florida Supreme Court in St. Johns County cited the ele-
ments of the dual rational nexus test as: 1) "a reasonable connection
between the need for additional schools and the growth in population
that will accompany new development,"' 15 and 2) "a reasonable con-
nection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds col-
lected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.""' Although the
court stated that the ordinance met the first prong of the dual rational
nexus test, because "the fee [was] designed to provide the capacity to
serve the educational needs of all ...dwelling units [built],"" 7 the
ordinance failed the second prong, because "there was no restriction on
the use of the funds to ensure they [would] be spent to benefit those
who have paid the fee.""11 8 The dual rational nexus test lacked the abil-
ity to insure that "recommended ways to maximize utilization of ex-
isting facilities""' 9 has occurred. Furthermore, the inclusion of a "less
intrusive alternative means" component, established in the needs-nexus
analysis, would perform this function and is the appropriate test for the
validation of educational impact fees.
IV. ANALYZING ORDINANCE VALIDITY
A. Reasonable Relationship to Dual Rational Nexus Tests
The Third District Court of Appeal in Wald Corp. v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County2 ' analyzed the acceptability of two previously ap-
114. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 363, 364
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (Sharp, J.,
dissenting).
115. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
116. Id. at 637.
117. Id. at 638-39.
118. Id. at 639.
119. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74, at 1.
120. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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plied tests for determining the constitutional validity of subdivision ex-
actions. These were the "reasonable relationship" and "specifically and
uniquely attributable" tests.12' The "reasonable relationship" test states
that the subdivision exaction requirement be "reasonably related to the
needs of the municipality;" however, the "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" test further narrows this requirement to one being "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to the subdivider's activity.' 2 2 The
Third District Court of Appeal outlined the weaknesses of both tests. 28
These tests interchange the burden of proving the nexus between
the new development and the needs created among the developer and
the municipality. The inadequacies of these tests originate from their
inherent inflexibility. While the reasonable relationship test affords mu-
nicipalities almost unchecked powers to impose fees, the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test would require verification that the de-
velopment is the single reason for the shortage in school facility capac-
ity, and therefore, unreasonable burdening of the municipality. 2
The court in Wald was confronted with an ordinance which condi-
tioned the approval of future development plans on the dedication of
land to be used for a canal system.'2 5 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal stated that this subdivision requirement would be valid
under either the "reasonable relationship" test or "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test, 26 the court, in a well prepared evaluation
of these two tests, determined that a new "rational nexus approach pro-
vides a more feasible basis for testing subdivision dedication require-
ments . . ".., One reason the court found this analysis attractive
was because it "balanced the prospective needs of the community and
the property rights of the developer [and] .. .treated the business of
subdividing as a profit-making enterprise ....,28
Likewise, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hollywood, Inc.
Ct. App. 1976).
121. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
801 (I11. 1961) (specifically and uniquely attributable test); Ayres v. City Council of
Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 1949) (reasonable relationship test).
122. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 866-67.
125. Id. at 864.
126. Id. at 865.
127. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 868.
128. Id.
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v. Broward County,129 in deciding the constitutionality of an ordinance
effecting the county park system, advanced the present form of the
dual rational nexus test applied in St. Johns County.130 In Hollywood,
the court addressed a subdivider's challenge to an ordinance requiring
either the dedication of land, or the payment of a fee in lieu of land
dedication for a county park program."' 1 The court held that the "ex-
actions are shown to offset, not exceed, reasonable needs sufficiently
attributable to the new subdivision residents . . . [and that the] capital
assets will sufficiently benefit those new residents.3 2 However, there are
important factual distinctions between the land dedication exaction in
Wald, and the monetary educational impact fee addressed by the court
in St. Johns County.' The differences between subdivision dedications
and impact fees are important. Two reasons need to be explored: 1)
land is unique, and 2) dedicating land draws a "proper distinction[]
between the individual property-holder and subdivider.' 3 4
First, the land in question might be so unique that even the alter-
natives to land dedication offered by the ordinance in Hollywood, pay-
ment of a fee in lieu of the dedication, 3 5 would not be acceptable. For
example, the land dedicated for new school facility construction should
be central to its related community, enabling students to attend school
without traveling extensive distances. Second, the benefits of property
subdivision accruing to a subdivider may require the dedication of land
to maintain a balance between the community and subdivider, differen-
tiating between the treatment of individual land owners and profit-
making enterprises. 136 The test used by a court in determining the va-
lidity of impact fees should be flexible enough to allow the municipality
room to provide for its growing community; however, it should be strict
enough to insure that the proper method is chosen. In order to provide
for the flexibility required, the dual rational nexus test must be further
developed.
Further development of this test requires a determination as to
whether the ordinance is classified as a "development exaction" or
129. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1983).
130. St. Johns County, 583 So.2d at 637.
131. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 610.
132. Id. at 614.
133. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
134. Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 868.
135. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 607.
136. ld. at 610.
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"user impact fee.' 7 This classification methodology supports a bal-
ance between the equities of the developer and the municipality, by
incorporating and evaluating the type, size and cost of the construction
proposed. The effect of the classification is important to the obligations
and standards applied to the parties by this proposed "needs-nexus
analysis."' 38 The definitions for subdivision exactions and user impact
fees in the needs-nexus analysis are the following:
1. Subdivision Exaction-Traditional construction, dedication, or
in-lieu-fee payment for site-specific needs imposed at the time of
subdivision. These improvements are usually categorized as being
"minor" in scope and cost, and are typically provided on-site. Ex-
amples include subdivision streets, sidewalks, trails, utility ease-
ments, and open space.
2. User Impact Fee-More recent device to fund major, off-site
infrastructure expansion imposed at the building permit stage. Ex-
amples include expansion or improvement of sewage treatment fa-
cilities, landfills, primary roadways, schools, and active recrea-
tional parks.139
The definition suggested for a "user impact fee" conforms to the situa-
tion found in St. Johns County. Although the court there did not dis-
tinguish between subdivision exactions and user impact fees when eval-
uating the application of the dual rational nexus test, it is an essential
component for determining the validity of the ordinance. 14 0 The Florida
Supreme Court should re-evaluate the application of the dual rational
nexus test in the area of education because of the significant substan-
tive differences between the definitions of user impact fees and subdivi-
sion exactions. It is this conflict in definition substance which highlights
137. The Petitioners' initial brief defines the important distinctions between
"user" fees and "development exactions" as follows: "A user fee assumes that capacity
is available and imposes a fee for using the capacity. A development exaction is predi-
cated on the fact that capacity is not available (Section 163.3202(2)(g), Fla. Stat.
(1989)) or the developer should be given the alternative of financing an increase in
facilities capacity." Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 18.
138. Authors Delaney, Gordon and Hess, are concerned about the inability of
courts to distinguish clearly between the tests available. See Delaney et al., supra note
28. The needs-nexus analysis is a test unifying the "reasonable relationship," "specially
and uniquely attributable," and "rational nexus" tests for determining the validity of
impact fees. Id.
139. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 141.
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the need for test reform.
B. The Need for Test Reform: "Needs-Nexus Analysis"
The "needs-nexus analysis"141 is the appropriate test for analyzing
the public educational impact fee proposed by the St. Johns County
Ordinance. Because impact fees which focus on educational facilities
reflect complications unique to themselves," the test applied by the
court should reflect an understanding of these problems.143 The "need-
nexus analysis" was designed to examine the validity of both "subdivi-
sion exactions" and "user impact fees."' 44 This test categorizes new
school facility construction as a user impact fee because of the large
estimated project size, and the fact that the fee is exacted at the permit
stage, rather than at subdivision.4 5 However, since the need for in-
141. See generally Delaney et al., supra note 28.
142. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (Constitutional mandate for "uniform system of
free public schools").
143. See Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test,
and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 992 n.3 (1989) ("Many states
have resolved these conflicts by adopting some variation of the rational nexus rule
.") (emphasis added).
In addition, although the United States Supreme Court has not expanded the defi-
nition of fundamental rights beyond that which is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, where the Court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), held that the differences in expenditures per student from local
property tax funding is constitutional where the procedure is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, it has considered that issues of public education to require
more than the mere rationality review applied to social welfare interests. See Plyer v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). In Plyer, the level of scrutiny of a Texas statute deny-
ing the funding for public education of illegal aliens was elevated to protect against the
denial of an education:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitu-
tion. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguish-
able from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of
its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.
Id.
Because the Florida Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between impact
fees for sewer and water facility connections and education, St. Johns County, 583 So.
2d at 638, the court should reevaluate the applicability of the dual rational nexus test.
144. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 139.
145. Id. (The Educational Impact Fee proposed in St. Johns County contains
elements of both the subdivision exaction determination where the need is "attributable
to [the] subdivision," and also resembles the definition of a user impact fee offered by
23
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creased new school facilities has been created by the subdivision for the
subdivision, as opposed to the creation of an area wide need, the St.
Johns County ordinance also parallels the needs-nexus test's definition
of a subdivision exaction." 6 Therefore, further development of the dual
rational nexus test should compile elements from tests considering both
categories: subdivision exactions and user impact fees.
The needs-nexus analysis for subdivision exactions is similar to the
dual rational nexus test applied by the supreme court in St. Johns
County.117 Further development of the dual rational nexus test would
require three steps. First, determine whether the need for additional
school facilities is generated by the growth in population created by the
new development. Second, ascertain whether there is a reasonable con-
nection between the fee imposed and the service rendered to the devel-
opment. Third, determine if there are any "less intrusive means availa-
ble" 148 by closely examining legislative intent.
The policy presented by this additional third element is to require
the exploration of all possible methods of financing such large infra-
structure projects, as well as alternative methods for reducing the need
for additional new school facilities."49 The municipality should not im-
plement a revenue raising tool merely because it is unlikely to raise
outrage by municipal residents. Impact fees are directed at a silent
the needs-nexus test.).
146. Id. at 158-59.
147. Although the court stated: "In essence, [we] approved the imposition of im-
pact fees that meet the requirements of the dual rational nexus test adopted by other
courts in evaluating impact fees," the court made no study of its own into the validity
of the test. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637. The court articulated the require-
ments as: 1) the demonstration of a rational nexus between additional facility needs
and the growth in population created by the new developments; and 2) a rational nexus
between the "expenditure of funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivi-
sion." Id. See generally Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 152-53; Juergensmeyer &
Blake, supra note 4, at 431-33.
148. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161 (examples for "less intrusive alterna-
tives" are increasing the general tax rate or by the use of general obligation bonds). In
addition, the Facilities Task Force addressed issues for maximizing present facilities,
none of which are politically palatable decisions. See Facilities Task Force, supra note
74, at 12.
It is noted that the three elements defined for the needs-nexus test suggested by
this Comment are a compilation of the components of the nexus prongs offered for both
subdivision exactions and user impact fees with the burden of proof on the government.
It would be the government's burden to show that less intrusive alternatives are not
available. See Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 158-59.
149. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74.
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constituency, 150 those not yet part of the local voting population, 1 5 and
therefore, are politically aesthetic. The addition of the less intrusive
alternative element would require the court to further scrutinize the
previous elements as well as research the effectiveness, not only of the
impact fee, but of alternative methods for financing or reducing the
need for new school facilities.' 52
150. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161.
151. [O]wners of undeveloped land, developers, and consumers of new de-
velopment are poorly represented minorities. Their votes are few; many of
them have no vote at all, as they are not (or are not yet) residents of the
[municipality]; their campaign contributions and lobbying efforts are inef-
fectual. The homeowning majority has every incentive to minimize its own
tax burden by developing a source of municipal revenue, the burden of
which falls on these groups.
Note, supra note 143, at 1007; see also Daniel W. Sweet & Lee P. Symons, Pennsylva-
nia's New Municipalities Planning Code: Policy, Politics, and Impact Fees, 94 DICK.
L. REV. 76, 91-2 (1989) stating:
The political question most aptly formulated with respect to impact fees
and related exactions is as follows: "It is easy to understand the genesis for
this type of regulation. After all, elected officials would prefer to tax those
who do not vote. But it is hard to justify this type of requirement as a
matter of law. A decision by a municipal governing body to impose the
cost of the new fire house on the new residents, via zoning regulations, is in
effect a taxation decision." . . . The current Pennsylvania practice of mon-
etary exactions is questionable, both as a matter of law and as a matter of
public policy. These ad hoc deals possess tremendous potential for abuse
and corruption. Impact fee legislation, which is based upon studies by
planners employed by the municipalities that desire to enact the ordi-
narces, threatens to subtly disguise nonuniform taxation.
(quoting 1 R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3.17 (1981)).
In 1987, the California Newhall School District submitted a resolution for a "spe-
cial tax" to fund capital outlay projects and which included the addition of school-
impact fees. California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Newhall School Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 497
(Ct. App. 1988). "Not surprisingly, the special taxes were overwhelmingly supported
by district voters not subject to the new exaction." Daniel J. Curtin Jr. & Michael P.
Durkee, 'Special' Tax is Still a Tax, 102 L.A. DAILY J. 5 (January 6, 1989) (emphasis
added); See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VIIIA (Proposition 13, passed June 6, 1978, re-
quires a two-thirds voter approval on resolutions).
152. In examining the "less intrusive alternatives available," the authors of the
need-nexus analysis offer the following questions to be considered by a court in their
examination:
-What is the amount of the fee and its likely impact upon the ultimate
consumer when passed through by the developer?
-How healthy is the municipality's assessable base? Is it growing or
1991]
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V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court contends that the legislature did not
eroding?
-Is the municipality's tax rate low in comparison to similar situated politi-
cal subdivisions?
-What is the municipality's bond rating? Will increased taxes or borrowing
to fund public improvements jeopardize it?
-Has the municipality's current capital improvements program (CIP) kept
pace with previous programs? How does the current CIP compare to its
predecessors in relation to the current size of the municipality and growth
trends?
-Is the municipality's existing housing stock sufficiently diverse and inclu-
sionary to accommodate a variety of income groups including low and
moderate-income families?
-Is the fee, in reality, a double tax on the consumer? In other words, is
the new-home purchaser, who, like existing residents, pays deductible
property taxes for services, and also must pay a nondeductible impact fee
for the same service (though the increased price of the home), essentially
paying twice?
Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161-62 (quoting BUILDER AND ASS'N SERVICES Div.,
NATIONAL ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, IMPACT FEES: A DEVELOPER'S MANUAL at 4))
(emphasis added).
An additional question posed by these authors is:
-Is the affected property being credited for providing common facilities
that the municipality has provided without charge to other properties in
the service area?
See Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 162 (quoting Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jor-
dan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981)).
In addition to these questions suggested by Delaney, Gordon and Hess, the court
should consider these additional questions:
-What was the Education Estimating Conference's forecasts (for a period
of 10 years prior to 1989) on "student enrollments, fixed capital outlay
needs, and Florida Education Finance Program formula needs," as the
conference determined was needed for the state planning and budgeting
system?
See, e.g., Facilities Task Force, supra note 74 (where a facilities task force was ap-
pointed by the Commissioner of Education in 1989 to determine the "projected capital
outlay needs of the State of Florida to the year 2000."); see FLA. STAT. §§ 216.134(1),
.136(4)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
-Was a separate account to be known as the "Special Facility Construc-
tion Account," established as part of the Public Education Capital Outlay
and Debt Service Trust Fund to "provide necessary construction funds to
school districts which have urgent construction needs but which lack suffi-
cient resources at present, and cannot reasonably anticipate sufficient re-
sources within the period of the next 3 years, for these purposes from cur-
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intend to limit the ability of municipalities to meet the needs of its
growing community. However, this ability is not without clarification.
The supreme court, in the subsequent clarification of their opinion,
should have considered the constitutional validity of section 7(A)(5),
section 5(D) and the context of footnote six. Inclusion of a less intru-
sive means component to the dual rational nexus test will assist the
court in examining acceptable alternatives prior to the levying of im-
pact fees.
It seems that all logical paths for the understanding of infrastruc-
ture fees define them as either a tax or user fee, or at least the court
has not outwardly suggested another. In the area of education, an anal-
ogy to either of these definitions is fatal to the constitutional validity of
a related impact fee. The distinction between a fee levied for service
use, and the fee levied to increase capacity to serve lies only in seman-
tics. The St. Johns County Educational Impact Fee closely resembles a
user fee for all the reasons presented in this comment, and therefore, it
violates the constitutional mandate for free public schools. Fees for
educational facilities are far different from other forms of on or off site
facility improvements. Within the field of education, we must consider
individual rights founded upon the Florida Constitution and apply a
higher standard of analysis.
Concomitant to the contention that the St. Johns County Educa-
tional Impact Fee is nothing more than a user fee, this comment con-
tends that the dual rational nexus test is inappropriate in analyzing the
constitutional validity of educational impact fees. A requirement for
determining whether there are any "less intrusive alternatives" should
be preeminent in determining the validity of ordinances which either
threaten a constitutional imperative, or are directed at a silent constitu-
rently authorized sources of capital revenue?"
FLA. STA. § 235.435(2)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
And finally, what is the current status and availability of this account?
1991]
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ency, circumventing the legislature6 and the normal political
process. 5
Joseph Livio Parisi
153. (e) The Legislature finds and declares that the subject of the financ-
ing of school facilities with development fees is a matter of statewide con-
cern. For this reason the legislature hereby occupies the subject matter of
mandatory development fees and other development requirements for
school facilities finance to the exclusion of all local measures on the
subject.
CAL. Gov. CODE § 65995(e) (1991).
154. See Note, supra note 143, at 1006-08.
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